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often leads to the disclosure of the true criminal, and to the exonera-
tion of an innocent suspect.2 7
The wavering status of the exclusionary rule of the McNabb
case, and the varying interpretations thereof, indicate a need for a
clearer definition of its boundaries. By declining to extend the rule
to cases involving legal detention on another charge, the Court, it
is submitted, correctly delimited its application. The result is com-
mendable; the application of fixed exclusionary rules in cases where
the accused is amply protected by constitutional provisions is to be
discouraged. As stated by the Court: "An extension of a mechani-
cal rule based on the time of a confession would not be a helpful
addition to the rules of criminal evidence." 28
)X
LABOR LAW - COERCION OF RECOGNITION - JURISDICTION OF
STATE COURTS TO ENJOIN.-Plaintiff department store sought to en-
join the defendant labor union from interfering with its business by
maintaining picket lines. The alleged purpose of the picketing was
to coerce the plaintiff to recognize the defendant as the sole bargain-
ing agent of the plaintiff's employees, even though the defendant had
not been certified as such. Under the state law, it would have been
illegal for the plaintiff to recognize the defendant in this capacity
while there were conflicting claims being asserted by rival unions and
when no union had been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board.'
Special Term dismissed the complaint holding that the subject
matter falls within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act,
and that jurisdiction is thereby vested exclusively in the federal tri-
bunals. Held, reversed. The courts of New York have jurisdiction
to enjoin peaceful picketing engaged in to accomplish an unlawful
objective. The defendant's acts are not within the scope of the
National Labor Relations Act. Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303
N. Y. 300, 101 N. E. 2d 697 (1951).
27 Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court,
43 Iu.. L. REv. 442, 448 (1948).28 Carignan v. United States, 72 Sup. Ct. 97, 102 (1951).
1". ... there is no denying that it would be unlawful for the plaintiff
employers to yield to a demand that they recognize the defendant union instead
of some rival labor organization as the exclusive bargaining agent . . . in
advance of a certification by the National Labor Relations Board in the pend-
ing representation proceeding." Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N. Y. 300,
305, 101 N. E. 2d 697, 699 (1951); N. Y. CoxsT. Art. I, § 17, "Employees
shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through repre-




Prior to its amendment in 1947, the National Labor Relations
Act guaranteed that "[e] mployees shall have the right to self organ-
ization, to form, join or assist labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing .... " 2 The
Act, however, afforded no protection against coercion by labor unions.
In fact, such a measure was specifically rejected as inconsistent with
the policy of the Act.3 Hence, the conduct of union activities was
left open to state control.4
A sharp reversal in the policy of the law took place in 1947
when the Taft-Hartley Act brought a number of unfair labor union
practices within the scope of federal authority. Section 7 of the
Taft-Hartley Act not only guarantees employees the right to form,
join or assist labor organization, but also ". . . the right to refrain
from any and all such activities. ... Section 8(b) (1) 7 declares
it to be an unfair labor practice for a labor union to coerce or re-
strain employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7.
Thus, the 1947 amendment has given rise to an overlapping of state
and federal regulations affecting union activities.
The Taft-Hartley Act provides that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board shall have jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting in-
terstate commerce.8 The problem presented is whether Congress has
designedly left open for state control an area over which the states
have traditionally exercised jurisdiction, or whether it was the con-
gressional intent to pre-empt the field of labor relations.
Undoubtedly when state and federal law conflict, the federal
law is supreme.9 Thus, where the New York State Labor Board
entertained a petition to certify a bargaining agent for supervisory
employees at a time when it was the policy of the National Labor
Relations Board to refuse that type of petition,10 the Supreme Court
249 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1946).
3 SzN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16 (1935). "This erroneously
conceived mutuality argument that since employers are to be prohibited with in-
terfering with organization of workers, employees and labor organizations
should be no more active than employers in the organization of employees is
untenable; this would defeat the very object of the bill."
4Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U. S. 740 (1941) (by implication).
561 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(b) (Supp. 1951) (Taft-
Hartley Act); Cox, CASES ONT LABOR LAw 487, 488 (2d ed. 1951).
661 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (Supp. 1951) (Taft-Hartley
Act) (italics supplied).
761 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(b)(1) (Supp. 1951) (Taft-
Hartley Act).
861 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(b) (Supp. 1951) (Taft-
Hartley Act). "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent
any person from engaging in any labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting
commerce."
9 U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI.
10 Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N. L. R. B. 67 (1943); Maryland Drydock
Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943). The national policy was subsequently changed.
Packard Motor Car Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 1212, 1214 (1945).
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held that the New York courts were without power to act."i It is
clear, in this instance, that exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the
federal courts.
A second problem arose in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board 12 where the federal and
state laws were consistent. Here the state board was permitted to
maintain jurisdiction to enjoin an employer and union from giving
effect to a maintenance-of-membership clause, an identical power 13
granted to the national board.14  One year later, however, in
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Plankinton Packing Co.,'5
a similar case was presented to the Wisconsin courts over which they
retained jurisdiction on the strength 'I of the Algoma case. On ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was reversed, 17
but no opinion was rendered. The impact of the Plankinton case
is thus left in considerable doubt. While attempts have been made
to distinguish the cases,' 8 the latter decision has been thought to
effectively nullify the holding in the Algoma case,19 once again vest-
ing sole jurisdiction in the federal courts and in the national board.
A third situation arose in International Union, UAW v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board,20 where it was held that the
state may exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising from union ac-
tivities that are not covered by the Taft-Hartley Act.2 ' The Court,
11 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
U. S. 767 (1947). Although this case reached the New York Court of Appeals(295 N. Y. 601, 64 N. E. 2d 350) after the national policy had changed(August, 1945), the Supreme Court only took into consideration the national
policy that had existed when the action was first commenced. It was not until
May, 1945 that the Bethlehen case reached the Appellate Division. New
York State Labor Relations Board v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 269 App. Div. 805,
56 N. Y. S. 2d 195 (1945).
12336 U. S. 301 (1949). But cf. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 18 (1949).
1361 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §158(a)(3) (Supp. 1951) (Taft-
Hartley Act).
14 See note 8 supra.
15255 Wis. 285, 38 N. W. 2d 688 (1949).
'1 Id. at 692. "Every argument made by the Company and the Union in
support of their contention that the State Board was without jurisdiction is
answered adversely to them by the opinion of this court in Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 1948, 252 Wis.
549, 32 N. W. 2d 417, affirmed 1949, 336 U. S. 301. . . . No useful purpose
would be served by reiterating here what was so well said there."
17 Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338
U. S. 953 (1950).Is 34 MARQ. L. REv. 291, 294 (1951).
19 Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REV.
211, 220-221 (1950).
20336 U. S. 245 (1949).
21 The case involved an attempt by the union to compel recognition of a
collective bargaining agreement by calling repeated and unannounced work
stoppages. This novel form of union coercion is not one of the specifically
enumerated unfair labor practices listed in Section 8(b). It was not con-
RECENT DECISIONS
however, was careful to limit its holding by pointing out that the
federal board was without power to act ".... because it is the objec-
tives only and not the tactics of a strike which bring it within the
power of the Federal Board." 22 Clearly, when the tactics of a
strike are illegal, the activity is unprotected from state action by the
Taft-Hartley Act and may be enjoined by the state under its police
power.23  On the other hand, where the tactics are not illegal, as
in the case of peaceful picketing, the state courts are without juris-
diction since Congress has "... occupied this field and closed it to
state regulation." 24
In the principal case, the tactics employed were not illegal. Since
no strike was in progress and no bargaining representative certified,
the activity did not come within any of the unfair labor practices
listed in Section 8(b). But this does not mean that the activity does
not come within the intendment of the Act. In Section 14(b) ,25
Congress expressly provided that nothing in the Act authorizing
union shops shall be construed as validating such agreements in any
state where they are prohibited. It is thus evident that in at least
some instances in which Congress wanted the state law to be su-
preme, it expressly stated that the provisions of the Act would be
transcended by the over-riding state statute.2 6  Is it possible to infer
therefrom a congressional intent to preclude state regulation in those
situations not otherwise excepted?
sidered a "concerted activity" within the meaning of Section 7. See notes 5
and 6 supra.22 International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U. S. 245, 263 (1949). (Italics added.)23 Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U. S. 740 (1941) (strikers were disorderly and violent).
24 International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 457 (1950) ; Amal-
gamated Association of Street Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383 (1951).
25 61 STAr. 151 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 164(b) (Supp. 1951) (Taft-Hartley
Act). "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the ...
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization . . .
in any State or Territory in which such ... application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law."26 Cf. Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway & Motor Coach
Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383 (1951),
"When it amended the Federal Act in 1947, Congress was not only cognizant
of the policy questions that have been argued . . . but it was also well aware
of the problems in balancing state-federal relationships which its 1935 legis-
lation had raised. The legislative history of the 1947 Act refers to the de-
cision of this Court in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board, 330
U. S. 767 (1947), and, in its handling of the problems presented by that case,
Congress demonstrated that it knew how to cede jurisdiction to the states.
Congress knew full well that its labor legislation 'preempts the field that the
act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned'
and demonstrated its ability to spell out with particularity those areas in which
it desired state regulation to be operative." Id. at 397, 398.
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It is submitted that it is. Certainly, "[s] ilence under such cir-
cumstances is not tantamount to creating an exception in a field other-
wise pre-empted by the Congress." 27 Moreover, an interpretation
of the Labor Act provision favoring maximum assumption of juris-
diction by the federal tribunals would have the socially desirable
effect of developing uniform nation-wide standards of permissible
behavior.
M
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJuRY.-Plaintiff, born alive
despite negligent injuries sustained during his ninth month en ventre
sa mere, sued for damages.' Defendant moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term granted
defendant's motion; the Appellate Division affirmed by a divided
court.2 Held, reversed. When a viable fetus,3 later born alive, has
been negligently injured, a suit for damages will lie.4 Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951). 5
Recovery of damages for prenatal injuries was not one of the
common law tort actions.6  It was denied because of the lack of
27 Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N. Y. 300, 309, 101 N. E. 2d 697, 702
(1951) (dissenting opinion of Dye, J.). For further discussion of the prin-
cipal case, see Petro, The Developing Law, 2 CCH LABOR L. J. 8 (Dec.
1951) (approving the result). But cf. Wilkes Sportswear, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Ladies Garment Workers Union, 29 L. R. R. M. 2300 (1952). See
also Sandier, Minority Picketing for Recognition in New York State, 127
N. Y. L. J. 1094, col. 3 (Mar. 19, 1952).1 The suit was brought in the infant's name by its guardian ad litem.
2 The dissent refused ". . . to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn fic-
tion not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjustified."
278 App. Div. 913, 914, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417, 418 (1st Dep't 1951).
3 ..we confine our holding in this case to prepartum injuries to such
viable children .... This child, when injured, was in fact, alive and capable
of being delivered and of remaining alive, separate from its mother." 303
N. Y. 349, 357, 102 N. E. 2d 691, 695 (1951).
4Judge Lewis dissented, judge Conway joining, on the ground that this
remedy, if granted, should come from the legislature, not from the courts.
5 This writer believes that the Court of Appeals' opinion in the instant
case is so complete that a protracted study of the previous law regarding pre-
natal injuries is unnecessary. The arguments for denying recovery, based on
lack of precedent and on the difficulty of proof, are also covered by the Court.
But the Court expressly refused to deal with the "purely theoretical" objec-
tion that an unborn infant has no existence separate from its mother. "We
need not deal here with so large a subject." This writer believes that the
separate identity of the embryo and fetus should be the only ground for grant-
ing recovery; for that separate entity is a person, and as such should be ac-
corded the protection of tort law.
6Accord, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884);
cf. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900); Butler
v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N. Y. 417, 38 N. E. 454 (1894); see 4 RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 869 (1939); Note, 10 A. L. R. 2d 1059, 1060 (1950).
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